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Industrial Development in the EU: 
Lessons for the  
Future Member States? 
Abstract
The paper analyzes the main characteristics and major changes in manufacturing 
industry in the old EU member states over the past twenty years, in order to 
draw some lessons for the Southeast European economies in transition, often 
referred to as the Western Balkans (WBs) - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. During the last twenty 
years the more developed EU member states have experienced substantial changes 
in the structure of their economies, with services becoming the prevalent sector in 
terms of the most important indicators. Nevertheless, there is great heterogeneity 
within the EU regarding the contribution of manufacturing to employment and 
value added. The global financial and economic crisis from late 2008 onwards has 
revived the debate about the role of industry, its importance for economic growth 
and for international competitiveness. In this context, there has also been a 
renewed interest in industrial policy and reindustrialization. The ongoing analysis 
of trends in the EU could be extremely relevant for the WB countries, since these 
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countries have gone through a process of strong deindustrialization. Given that 
their level of economic development is still low, manufacturing industry remains 
indispensable for future economic growth. The EU experience could offer useful 
guidelines for formulating future policies in this area.
Keywords: industrial development, structural changes, industrialization, 
Western Balkans  
JEL classification: O14, L60, P20
1  Introduction1
The paper analyzes the main characteristics of manufacturing industry in the 
European Union (EU) member states, with the aim of drawing some main 
lessons for the Southeast European economies in transition - Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, frequently 
referred to as the Western Balkans (WBs). Croatia was the first from this group 
of countries to join the EU, on 1 July 2013, when it became the 28th EU member 
state. The other countries are also aspiring to become EU members over the 
coming years, so the experience in industrial development of the more developed 
EU countries could prove useful. 
The global financial and economic crisis has had a profound impact on most 
European economies from late 2008 onwards. The economic crisis has proved 
to last much longer than was initially expected, while the sovereign debt crisis in 
the eurozone has in the meantime added further worries to an already troubled 
European Economic and Monetary Union. The unexpected prolongation of the 
recession in a number of EU countries and the uncertain prospects of permanent 
economic recovery have also brought very different proposals of economists 
worldwide regarding the right recipes. These developments have revived the debate 
1 An earlier version of the paper was presented at the international conference “The Role of Europe’s Industry in 
the 21st Century”, organized by The Institute of Economics, Zagreb, November 21, 2013 in Zagreb, Croatia. The 
authors would like to thank the discussants and other participants of the conference for their comments, as well 
as two anonymous referees for useful suggestions in revising the paper.
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about the role of manufacturing industry, its importance for economic growth 
and for international competitiveness. The European Commission has proposed 
to increase the share of manufacturing value added from 16 to 20 percent of 
GDP by 2020 (European Commission, 2012), while in its latest Competitiveness 
Report it suggests to raise EU competitiveness through “knowledge-driven re-
industrialization” (European Commission, 2013). The recent Bruegel study on 
Europe’s manufacturing (Veugelers, 2013) also confirms the increasing relevance 
of these topics. Although the role of industrial policy remains controversial, the 
debate points to the importance of policy-induced measures for strenghthening 
competitiveness. Today these issues are extremely important for EU countries, 
but are even more important for the WBs, given that their level of development 
is still low, export performance is unsatisfactory and competitiveness on world 
markets is insufficient (Uvalic, 2013b). 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, some of the main features 
of the evolution of the industrial structure in the EU member states will be 
analyzed, including changes in the contribution of manufacturing employment 
and value added, intra-industry sectoral specialization and internationalization 
of EU manufacturing. The most important characteristics of the WB economies 
are briefly recalled in Section 3, in order to show why the ongoing debate on 
reindustrialization in Europe is highly relevant for these countries. Main policy 
recommendations for the WBs are given in Section 4, before drawing a few 
concluding remarks in Section 5.
2  The Changing Industrial Structure in the EU 
During the last twenty years the more developed EU member states have 
experienced substantial changes in the structure of their economies, characterized 
by a reduction in the share of manufacturing value added and employment, along 
with services becoming the prevalent sector. Nevertheless, it should be stressed 
that the two sectors have become increasingly complementary. There are a 
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number of industry-supporting services, such as product design, marketing, ICT 
supporting activities or assembling, that are important inputs for manufacturing 
production. At the same time, manufacturing has a carrier function for services, 
since services generally have limited tradability (European Commission, 2013: 
10). 
Despite the broad patterns of structural change towards a decline in the role of 
manufacturing industry, there is great heterogeneity within the EU, even among 
the old EU member states, regarding the contribution of manufacturing to 
employment and value added and the most competitive sectors. We will present 
the main features and changes that have taken place in manufacturing industry 
over the past two decades in the old EU member states, but occasionally also in 
the US as their main competitor.2 
2.1  Trends in Manufacturing Employment and Value Added
The share of manufacturing employment has declined substantially from the 
1970s until the early 2000s, as widely documented by Pilat et al. (2006) for all 
OECD countries. This decline has also been recorded throughout the 1990-2007 
period in both the EU-133 and the US, although there are notable differences 
between the two regions. In the US, the share in manufacturing employment 
went down from 15 percent in 1990 to a low 10 percent of total employment 
in 2007, whereas in the EU-13 it declined from over 20 percent in 1990 to 15 
percent in 2007 (OECD, 2014a). EU countries in 2007, therefore, had a share of 
manufacturing employment corresponding to the level that the US had seventeen 
years earlier (in 1990). 
However, within the EU, there are important cross-country differences. Among 
the economies with the highest drop in manufacturing employment one finds 
2 The analysis will cover mainly the period from 1990 to 2007 for two reasons: first, we wanted to get an insight 
into longer-term trends in the EU under “normal” conditions, before the outbreak of the global economic crisis; 
second, the main source of our data, OECD (2014a), does not cover all EU countries after 2006-2007. 
3 Greece and Protugal are not included because of lack of data in OECD (2014a) . 
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Germany, where the share of manufacturing employment fell by approximately 
9 percentage points, from 28.3 percent in 1990 to 19.0 percent in 2007 (OECD, 
2014a). Despite this decline, in 2007 Germany still had the second highest share 
in manufacturing employment after Italy (20.1 percent), whereas the US was 
the country with the lowest share (9.9 percent). Over the 1990-2007 period, 
Germany was the country that had the most remarkable decline in the share of 
manufacturing employment (9 percentage points), while Finland the least (less 
than 3 percentage points) (see Figure 1).

















































































Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
In most countries, the underlying cause of the decline of manufacturing 
employment shares was not only the increase of employment in services, but 
also the loss in absolute values of employees working in manufacturing; the only 
exception is Spain, which actually increased the number of employees by 15 
percent during the 1991-2007 period.4 The UK is the country that accounts for 
4 In this country, the high growth of employment in services essentially caused the decline of the manufacturing 
share.
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the largest percentage drop in the absolute value of employees in manufacturing 
(-33.3 percent) between 1991 and 2007 (OECD, 2014a).
Looking further into manufacturing employment from 1990 onwards, we can 
again note huge and persistent differences between the EU-13 and the US (see 
Figure 2). Among the EU countries, Germany registered a very steep decline 
in manufacturing employment in the early 1990s after the reunification of 
the country, but other countries – including Italy, the UK and France - also 
experienced similar, though less marked changes. 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a). 
Recent patterns in manufacturing employment also reflect significant shifts 
of production. If we consider the other key indicator, the contribution of 
manufacturing to value added available for more countries in the OECD 
database (OECD, 2014a), all data confirm previous findings concerning the 
declining role of manufacturing. From 1990 to 2007, the largest fall in the share 
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of manufacturing value added occurred in Luxembourg (from over 20 to around 
9 percent) and the UK (from over 22 to around 12 percent), while the lowest was 
recorded in Sweden where the decline was minimal (from 20.4 to 20.0 percent). 
Over the same period, Germany registered a decline of approximately five 
percentage points, lower than that observed in its employment manufacturing 
share, but in 2007 the share of manufacturing value added was still as high as 
23.6 percent, the highest among EU-15. These different patterns of employment 
and value added observed in Germany clearly reflect the modification of 
industrial relations of the mid-1990s and various labor market reforms (Carlin, 
2012; Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013). 
Despite these changes, in 2007 Germany still occupied a leading position among 
the EU economies with its manufacturing sector representing almost 25 percent 
of its total value added. An important driving force of Germany’s performance is 
its high R&D expenditure, the highest among the most important EU economies 
(see Figure 3). 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD(2014a).
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Along with R&D, another possible cause of the efficiency gap among EU 
countries as well as the EU and its major global partners is the excessive regulation 
of product markets. The limited degree of competition does not assure adequate 
incentives for individual firms to adopt the best strategies. This is because 
product market competition is a key factor influencing aggregate performance 
indicators such as productivity (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). Furthermore, as 
shown by the comparative analysis of Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta 
(2013) that covers five developed economies and three transition economies from 
Eastern Europe, excessive regulation can cause distortions due to misallocation 
of resources. The experience of the centrally-planned economies suggests that in 
countries characterised by widespread market- and policy-induced distortions, 
the largest businesses are not necessarily the most productive ones, but rather 
those that receive preferential treatment (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 
2013).
If we now consider the changes in the shares of both manufacturing employment 
and manufacturing value added in 2007 and compare them with the situation in 
1990, we find a variety of patterns (Figure 4). 
Interestingly, in Luxembourg, the UK and Spain, losses in the share of 
manufacturing employment were smaller than the decline in manufacturing 
value added. In Belgium, France and Italy, and somewhat less in the US, the 
reduction in manufacturing employment and in value added were of similar 
magnitudes. In the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Austria, Sweden 
and Finland, huge falls in manufacturing employment were not accompanied by 
as pronounced changes in value added, which were much more modest. Finland 
was the only country that, over the considered period, experienced an increase 
in the share of manufacturing value added simultaneously with a decline in 
manufacturing employment (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4:  Changes of Shares in Manufacturing Employment and Value Added in Some EU 








































































Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
In 2007, Finland held the first position among EU countries, with a share of 
24.2 percent of manufacturing value added, closely followed by Germany and 
somewhat less by Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Italy. For the EU-14 group 
(Portugal excluded), the average manufacturing value added in 2007 was 
substantially lower (16.5 percent), only slightly higher than for the US (13.2 
percent)5 (see Figure 5). It is interesting to note that the changes in manufacturing 
value added were not unidirectional in all EU countries. While most countries 
followed the pattern of declining manufacturing value added over the eighteen-
year period, Finland and Ireland initially, during 1990–2000, experienced an 
increase in manufacturing value added, followed by a decline only after 2000. 
5 Countries presented in Figure 4 are only those for which data were available both for employment and value added 
in the years considered. 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
The ongoing analysis of manufacturing employment and value added over the 
1990-2007 period leads to some important conclusions. 
First, observing temporal changes, we find that Germany experienced the largest 
drop of manufacturing in terms of employment, but much less in terms of value 
added, which in 2007 was still relatively high, close to 25 percent. 
Second, the general trend of declining relative importance of manufacturing was 
associated with losses in absolute levels of employment, which were recorded in 
all EU countries except Spain. 
Third, three EU economies should be singled out for the importance of 
manufacturing in 2007 (the last year considered): Finland had the highest relative 
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share in manufacturing value added, followed by Germany, while Italy had the 
highest share in manufacturing employment, followed again by Germany. 
Comparing the EU with the US, we find substantial differences. In the US, 
in 2007, only 10 percent of the workforce was engaged in manufacturing 
(as compared to the average for the EU-14 of 14 percent), while the share of 
manufacturing value added was rather low, close to 13 percent (as compared to 
the EU-14 average of 16.7 percent). 
2.2  Changes Within Manufacturing Sectors 
It is also important to examine whether cross-country differences in EU 
manufacturing, illustrated in the previous section, are accompanied by 
diversities within the manufacturing sector. During the 1990-2006 period, we 
observed considerable variations across subsectors. The most notable decline in 
employment shares within manufacturing occurred in textiles (from 12.6 in 
1990 to 7.2 percent in 2006), whereas for chemicals the opposite trend towards 
increase was recorded (from 9.9 percent in 1990 to 11.1 percent in 2006). These 
opposite tendencies of employment in textiles and chemicals were already 
observed for the period until the early 2000s by Pilat et al. (2006). 
If we further consider trends in shares of manufacturing employment by key 
sectors during the 1990–2006 period, we can note that one of the largest sectors, 
machinery and equipment, increased its relative share (see Figure 6). A slight 
increase has been recorded also in food, basic metals and transport equipment. 
In other subsectors, such as wood, paper products and other manufacturing, 
the employment share has been relatively stable, while in non-metallic minerals 
it has declined slightly. Therefore, some sectors did register an increase of their 
relative share over the 1990-2006 period, while only textiles registered a notable 
fall. 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
Statistics on the share of manufacturing value added by key subsectors during 
the same period confirm these findings (see Figure 7). If we consider the changes 
in manufacturing value added by sector over the 1990-2006 period, we note that 
the shares of some sectors have increased, including chemicals, machinery and 
equipment, and somewhat less food and transport equipment. At the same time, 
there was a strong fall in textiles.
The OECD database makes available information on different manufacturing 
activities classified by Eurostat according to R&D intensities (R&D expenditure 
as a share of sales) and based on NACE Rev. 1.1 at 3-digit levels. Four different 
groups are given: i) high-tech sectors, i.e. the knowledge based industries, such 
as pharmaceuticals, aerospace and advanced electronics; ii) medium-high-tech 
sectors, such as chemicals, cars, and other engineering industries; iii) medium-
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low-tech industries such as fuels, basic metals and mineral products; and iv) low-
tech manufacturing, including food, textiles, wood and paper products. 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
A comparison of the EU countries and the US in high-tech manufacturing 
employment (Figure 8) and the respective shares of manufacturing value added 
(Figure 9) illustrates well the persistent advantage of the US held throughout the 
observed period, although there are clear signs of EU’s catching up.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a); EU data refer to Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Sweden.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a); EU data refer to: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. 
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Within the EU, we observe great differences regarding the role of high-tech 
sectors between the two main manufacturing leaders, namely Germany, where 
knowledge-based industries have had an increasing importance, and Italy, where 
the 2000s were characterized by just the opposite trend (see Figure 10). Note 
also that in France the value added share in manufacturing of high-tech sectors 
is increasing over the whole period and is approaching the values recorded in the 
US and the UK.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
Regarding medium high-tech sectors (see Figure 11), there are striking 
differences between Germany and Italy in two key sectors, namely chemicals and 
transport equipment, since the two countries have registered opposite trends. 
The comparative advantage of Germany in medium-high-tech sectors is clear 
from Figures 11 and 12. Statistical information gathered by the OECD database 
confirm that Germany tended to strengthen its international competitiveness 
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in the production of capital goods, pharmaceutical and consumer durables in 
which it traditionally enjoyed a comparative advantage (Bonatti and Fracasso, 
2013; see also Coricelli and Wörgötter, 2012). On the contrary, in Italy the 
shares of value added of chemicals and transport equipment have been relatively 
stable or declining; only in machinery and equipment has the value added share 
slightly increased.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD(2014a).
2.3  Internationalisation of Manufacturing 
The growing orientation of manufacturing production towards foreign markets 
is a widespread phenomenon in the EU and the US from the 1990s onwards, as 
evidenced by increasing shares of manufacturing exports (see Figure 13). These 
trends confirm that the growth of international trade has been faster than that 
recorded in manufacturing production. For some countries, however, such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands, the high values are mainly caused by re-exports of 
imported goods (Pilat et al. 2006).6
The trend in internationalization of manufacturing is extremely variable among 
the EU member states and with respect to the US (see Figure 14). 
6 Recent research indicates that as much as 40 percent of total exports in the Netherlands should be considered as 
re-exports of imported goods, without being significantly processed; see Pilat et al. (2006: 16).
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a); data for Portugal, Sweden, and the UK refer to 2006.






















































































Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
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The two main global players in manufacturing in 2000, the US and Germany, 
occupied top positions also in 2007. However, over the 2000-2007 period, the 
market share of Germany has increased, while that of the US has declined, 
so there was a reversal of their relative positions. Other countries that have 
experienced a decline in their market shares are the UK and France, but these 
countries nevertheless remain with values above the average for the EU-15 
(see Figure 14). The increasing share of export market shares of Germany is 
particularly significant, because it occurred in a global scenario in which the 
EU-15 has recorded a stable trend, while on average, over the whole period, there 
has been a fall in export shares of around 10 and 5 percentage points for the G-7 
and all OECD countries, respectively (OECD, 2014a).
Another way of assessing the relative strength of different countries in 
international trade is to compute the Relative Comparative Advantage (RCA) 
indicator.7 Recent OECD data (OECD, 2014b) show that in 2009 the EU-15 
had a comparative advantage in food, wood and paper products, chemicals, basic 
metals and machinery (see Figure 15). The US also shows a comparative advantage 
in wood and paper products, similar to the EU-15, a weak specialization in 
chemicals and non-metalic mineral products, but a stronger specialization in 
transport equipment. China has clearly become strongly specialized in textiles 
and electric and optical equipment. 
Changes in specialization over the 2005–2009 period for the EU-15 should also 
be considered (see Figure 16; values above/below the x-axis reveal specialization/
de-specialization). 
7 The RCA index is defined as the ratio of a country’s exports in a given sector in its total exports, and the share of 
world exports of the same sector in total world exports. A county’s RCA index is equal or lower than one in the 
case of no specialization, while it is higher than one in the case of specialization. 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014b).








































































































Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014b).
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During the 2005-2009 period, the EU-15 reduced its comparative advantage 
in food, as well as in wood and paper products. In addition, by 2009 they were 
more de-specialized in textiles, electrical and optical equipment and other 
manufacturing with respect to 2005. On the contrary, the EU-15 increased its 
specialization in chemicals and, slightly, in basic metals and machinery and 
equipment. 
An analysis of export market shares of manufacturing in the EU-15 and the US 
by type of technology during the 2000-2007 period shows additional interesting 
results. In high-tech sectors, the US holds the first (but declining) position in 
exports relative to the world, followed by Germany that has increased its market 
share, suggesting a clear catching-up process (see Figure 17). Other EU countries 
with a significant export share in world high-tech manufacturing include 
Netherlands, France, the UK and Belgium (all above the average value recorded 
in the EU-15). 
























































































Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
27
Mirella Damiani and Milica Uvalic
Industrial Development in the EU: What Lessons for the Future Member States?
Croatian Economic Survey  :   Vol. 16   :   No. 1   :   April 2014   :   pp. 5-48
On the contrary, in medium-high-tech sectors, the supremacy of Germany is 
confirmed by its higher and increasing market share in global trade during the 
2000-2007 period, whereas the US has registered a declining share (see Figure 
18). Interestingly, the UK, Italy, Belgium and France have export market shares 
of medium-high-tech manufacturing which are less than half of German’s share. 






















































































Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
We also considered manufacturing export market shares classified into six broad 
categories (see Figure 19). The EU-15 during 2000-2008 has increased its export 
market shares in high, medium-high, low and particularly high and medium-
high-tech sectors; these gains have been offset by losses in medium-low and ICT-
tech manufacturing sectors. 
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Figure 19:  Changes in Manufacturing Export Market Shares of EU-15 Relative to the World, 






















































Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
A clear illustration of enormous differences within the EU-15 is given by the 
comparison of Germany and Italy, the two European manufacturing leaders. 
During the 2000-2008 period, in two medium-tech sectors, chemicals and 
production of capital goods, OECD data confirm the increasing strength of 
Germany and the stable or declining position of Italy. Furthermore, Italy does 
not seem to have compensated its stagnant role in global trade in these medium-
high-tech sectors by increasing its market shares in other medium-high-tech 
actvities. On the contrary, during the 2000-2008 period, Italy continued to be 
strongly specialized in medium-low and low-tech sectors, although exports of 
these sectors recorded a considerable decline. By contrast, over the same period, 
Germany showed increasing export market shares in all sectors, with the only 
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exception of medium-low sectors.8 Interestingly, even the low-tech sectors 
recorded a considerable increase (OECD, 2014a). 
Summing up, the decline in the shares of manufacturing employment and 
value added has occurred in a context of increasing globalization, that has led 
to boosts in export intensity, with manufacturing trade growing more rapidly 
than production. However, not all countries have benefited equally from this 
trend. Germany is undoubtedly one of the winners, given that it has increased 
its manufacturing export share and has narrowed the gap with respect to the 
US, that over the same period experienced just the contrary (a loss of its export 
market share). In high-tech sectors, however, Germany’s catching-up process 
is far from complete. On the whole, EU-15 manufacturing export shares have 
remained stable, whereas G-7 and the OECD countries, on average, appear to be 
losers (see OECD, 2014a).
The EU-15, on average, maintains a comparative advantage in food, wood and 
paper products, chemicals, and to a lesser extent in production of capital goods. 
Furthermore, a reduction of medium-low and ICT export shares has taken 
place, and this has been offset by increases of high and medium-high sectors. 
In particular, Germany has gained a higher world share in medium-high-tech 
sectors: chemicals, machinery and equipment, and production of vehicles. In 
Italy, on the contrary, specialization processes in these sectors were generally 
more fragile. Italy’s export performance reveals disappointing results, as is 
signalled by its export market shares - 4.46 percent in 2000 and 4.39 percent in 
2008, respectively. Italy continues to have stronger specialization in medium-low 
and low-tech sectors.
The analysis therefore confirms the leading role in manufacturing of the US 
and Germany, but in different areas - in the production of high-tech, and 
medium-high-tech sectors, respectively. Furthermore, the comparison of the two 
8 The medium-low-tech sectors include: manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels; 
manufacture of rubber and plastic products; basic metals and fabricated metal products; other non-metallic 
mineral products; building and repairing of ships and boats.
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traditionally major manufacturing economies, Germany and Italy, suggests an 
increasing polarization of EU countries between core and pheripheral economies. 
As mentioned initially, our analysis covers only the pre-crisis period (until 2008). 
It ought to be noted, however, that the global crisis has had a very different 
impact on the manufacturing sector of individual EU members. There is a lot 
of diversity among countries and not all of them were able to recover quickly. 
According to the Competitiveness Report (European Commission, 2013), it is the 
countries that have maintained a large manufacturing base that have fared better, 
while the recovery has been driven mainly by exports of manufactures. After 
the global economic crisis, Germany improved its export record impressively, 
especially after 2010, recovering faster than other countries. It registered the 
highest increase in the share of manufacturing in 2010, when it occupied the 
leading position among EU-15, with a share of 20 percent of total value added. 
3  The Fundamental Role of Manufacturing 
Industry in the Western Balkans
The ongoing analysis of trends in the EU is extremely relevant for the WB 
countries, not only because these countries are aspiring to join the EU. For a series 
of reasons linked to the structural features of the WB economies, manufacturing 
industry remains indispensable for economic growth and catching up with the 
more developed EU member states. Despite remarkable achievements in the 
WBs after 2000 – political and economic stabilization, strong growth (until 
2009), fast trade liberalization, rapid trade recovery and increasing foreign direct 
investment (FDI) – the success story of the Central East European and Baltic 
(CEEB) countries from the 1990s has not been replicated a decade later in the 
WBs.9 For a series of specific reasons linked to the legacies of the 1990s, the WB 
economies were in a far worse situation in the early 2000s than were most CEEB 
countries in the early 1990s. Three groups of factors are primarily responsible for 
9 Cyprus and Malta also became EU member states in 2004 but will not be considered, since their very different 
history with respect to the CEEB countries makes them less relevant for our analysis of the WB countries. 
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the delayed attainment of some transition objectives in the WBs: the political 
events of the 1990s that have also greatly contributed to economic instability; 
delayed integration with the EU and related exclusion of the WBs from main EU 
programs sustaining transition in Eastern Europe; and inappropriate economic 
policies, that have focused primarily on fast liberalization, macroeconomic 
stabilization and privatization, neglecting many other important microeconomic 
reforms (see Uvalic, 2012). While the third factor is common to both the WB 
and CEEB countries, the WBs missed the opportunity to draw lessons from 
the CEEB experience accumulated a decade earlier, thus ignoring the “post-
Washington consensus” formulated in the second half of the 1990s (Kolodko 
and Nuti, 1997). 
It was expected that after years of isolation and stagnant or declining trade 
in the WB region, the acceleration of economic reforms after 2001 would 
ensure export-led growth, but this objective has not been effectively attained. 
During the 2000s, despite a fast increase in both exports and imports, the WB 
countries have had huge and, until 2009, continuously increasing trade deficits. 
Moreover, as economies they remain relatively closed and less integrated into 
the world economy than most CEEB countries. Strong GDP growth in the WB 
countries over the 2001-2008 period, rather than export-led, has mainly been 
based on growth of domestic demand stimulated by the rise in credit, wages and 
remittances. Today, weak export performance is the key structural deficiency of 
the WB economies, to a large extent due to limited restructuring of key industries 
that today are not competitive on world markets.
A comparison of the respective exports of goods and services/GDP ratios of 
the WBs and the CEEB countries reveals that WB countries have lower ratios 
than most CEEB countries (the only exceptions are Poland and Romania, as the 
largest countries) (see Figure 20). A variety of other indicators that are important 
for determining a country’s competitiveness also indicate that the WBs are less 
competitive than the CEEB countries (see Figure 21 and Uvalic, 2013b). 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the World Bank World Development Indicators (2014).
Unsatisfactory export performance derives primarily from supply-side factors and 
structural problems of the WB economies (Uvalic, 2013b). Three characteristics 
of the WB economies must be stressed in this regard: (1) the extreme process 
of deindustrialization since the early 1990s; (2) the inadequate volume and 
structure of FDI; and (3) structural changes in favor of fast growth of primarily 
non-tradable services. 
(1) All the WB countries have undergone a very strong process of 
deindustrialization, more extreme than in CEEB. Many industrial sectors have 
not been modernized and restructured after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 
1991. During the 1990s, restructuring of many enterprises was postponed due 
to political instability that often caused delays in privatization and impeded the 
arrival of FDI. The process of deindustrialization was not only typical of the 
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1990s, as in other post-socialist economies, but it also continued in the 2000s 
in most countries. In Serbia, the tradable goods sector, consisting mainly of 
industrial goods and some agricultural products, has actually reduced its relative 
share from over 42 percent in 2001 to 24 percent in 2008 (Uvalic, 2010). 
Figure 21:  Overall Index and Subindexes of Global Competitiveness of the Western Balkan 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on World Economic Forum (2013).
A comparison of the WBs with the economically more advanced CEEB countries 
can again prove useful. In CEEB, after the strong collapse in the early 1990s, 
growth recovery was accompanied by improving trade balances (even surpluses) 
and in some countries by reindustrialization. This was not the case in the WB 
countries, where the process of deindustrialization and the decline in the relative 
importance of industry has, in most cases, continued also in the 2000s. Although 
there are no huge differences in the shares of industry value added of the CEEB 
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and WB countries, some countries like Albania and Montenegro do have much 
lower shares (see Figure 22). The CEEB countries in 2008 generally had higher 
shares of industry value added than the WB countries, ranging from 29 percent 
to 38 percent of their respective GDPs. 
In 2000, the two WB countries that had least suffered from the process of 
deindustrialization were FYR of Macedonia and Serbia, both having maintained 
industry value added shares in GDP of over 30 percent. FYR of Macedonia 
stands out as the most industrialized Balkan country, with a share of industry 
value added of 34 percent, similar to that of Slovenia or Poland. However, the 
only Balkan country that has registered a slight increase in the contribution of 
industry over the 2000-2008 period is Bosnia and Herzegovina (from 23 to 
29 percent of GDP), while in all the other countries the shares have stagnated 
(Albania, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia) or declined (Montenegro, Serbia). 
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Source: Svejnar and Uvalic (2012) based on World Bank World Development Indicators (2014). 
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If we look at more recent data on specifically manufacturing industry (thus 
excluding mining, construction, and electricity, gas and water supply), 
our conclusions about strong deindustrialization of the WB economies are 
grossly confirmed. Most WB countries registered a rather pronounced fall in 
manufacturing value added over the 2000-2012 period, to a very low share of 
GDP, ranging from 6 percent (Montenegro) to 16 percent (Albania, Croatia, 
Serbia) (see Figure 23). Only Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
experienced modest reindustrialization during the 2000s, but their shares of 
manufacturing value added still remain extremely low – in 2012, 16 percent 
and 12 percent of their respective GDPs – particularly considering their very low 
level of development (see below). Moreover, these WB shares are also extremely 
low if compared with shares of manufacturing value added in 2012 in some of 
the old EU member states (Germany - 21 percent, Finland - 19 percent, Italy 
- 17 percent), but also respective shares in the new EU member states (Czech 
Republic – 24 percent, Hungary – 23 percent, Slovak Republic – 21 percent, 
Slovenia – 21 percent, Poland – 19 percent) (World Bank, 2014). 
(2) Specific features of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in WB countries have also 
contributed to insufficient recovery of manufacturing and unsatisfactory export 
growth. Most WB countries have attracted increasing FDI only after 2001, but 
inflows have been relatively low if compared to FDI in CEEB, the Community 
of Independent States, or even Bulgaria and Romania (Uvalic, 2010). FDI has 
not only arrived much later to the WBs than to the CEEB region but has had 
different characteristics (see Estrin and Uvalic, 2013). FDI was a key driver of 
economic growth in the CEEB countries, but in the WBs the composition of 
FDI has often not favored industrial restructuring. Manufacturing as the main 
sector for developing export potential was significant in the CEEB countries, but 
much less so in the WBs (see Becker et al., 2010). In CEEB many industries have 
been modernized thanks to investments by multinationals from Western Europe, 
while in the Balkans this has happened much less frequently (see Kalotay, 2010). 
The dominant part of FDI in the WBs has been in services, including banking, 
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telecommunication, wholesale and retail trade and real estate, while relatively 
little has been invested in manufacturing industry (see Estrin and Uvalic, 2013). 
Due to such a structure of FDI, the Balkan countries have not been successful in 
integrating into global supply chains (Handjiski et al., 2010: 16).
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on World Bank World Development Indicators (2014).
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Figure 24:  Sectoral Composition of FDI in the Western Balkans
Albania
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Source: Estrin and Uvalic (2013), based on WIIW data.
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Figure 25:  GDP Per Capita (PPS) in the Western Balkan Countries 












Source: Authors elaboration based on Eurostat (November 2012); also in Uvalic (2013a: 80).
(3) One of the consequences of the previous two characteristics is that structural 
changes in the WBs have brought a strong increase in services. Today the largest 
part of GDP, over 60 percent, in all WB countries, is produced in services – 
telecommunications, trade, banking, real estate – which are non-exportable. The 
high GDP growth rates registered in 2001-2008 in the WBs were due to the fast 
expansion and high growth rates of services, much more than of manufacturing 
industry or agriculture. These changes also help explain why export performance 
of most WB countries has not been more impressive. The relatively high level of 
value added in services seems rather high, considering that the WB countries, 
all except Croatia, are still at a low level of development. In 2011, Croatia was 
the only one approaching 60 percent of the EU-27 average GDP per capita (at 
Purchasing Power Standards – PPS), while all the other countries had a GDP 
per capita ranging from 21 percent (Kosovo) to 40 percent (Montenegro) of the 
EU-27 average (see Figure 25). Slow industrial restructuring also contributed 
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to limited economic recovery of 1989 GDP, since by 2008 three WB countries 
had still not reached the GDP level produced in 1989 – Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Montenegro (Uvalic, 2010: 258). 
4  What Policies for the Future? 
The global economic crisis from 2008 onwards has raised many questions 
regarding economic policies applied in both Western and Eastern Europe. Within 
the general debate, there has been a strong and renewed interest in industrial 
policy and reindustrialization, as evidenced in writings by Chang (2009), Rodrik 
(2008a, 2008b), Lin and Monga (2010) and others. Perhaps surprisingly, some 
of the traditional wisdom regarding the benefits of the off-shoring of production 
processes is also being questioned. The ongoing debate has been rather lively 
in some of the most developed EU member states as well, such as Italy, where 
manufacturing exports have been a driving force of fast economic growth during 
several decades of post-World War II development. 
The European Commission has also proposed a somewhat different approach to 
industrial policy than the one that has dominated throughout the 2000s, namely 
an industrial policy sustaining certain industrial sectors that are regarded crucial 
for strengthening EU competitiveness. From a historical perspective, EU industrial 
policy has gradually evolved from the “vertical” approach that dominated 
in the 1970s based on various types of state subsidies to selected enterprises, 
towards a much more liberal approach, where industrial policy throughout the 
2000s has mainly consisted of “horizontal” measures offered to all enterprises 
without discrimination, aimed at increasing enterprise competitiveness - such 
as supportive business environment, incentives for investing in R&D, measures 
to support small and medium-sized enterprises, services for the creation of 
enterprise networks and technology parks, and cooperation between research 
institutions and industry (Bianchi and Labory, 2009). More recently, however, 
in a flagship initiative of the Europe 2020 strategy, the Commission emphasises 
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not only horizontal measures but also the sector-specific dimension of industrial 
policy, identifying concrete sectors for development at a European level, such 
as space technology, clean and energy-efficient motor vehicles, environmental 
goods, energy supply industries, agro-food and business services (European 
Commission, 2010). In December 2012, the EU adopted a series of sector-specific 
measures that go in the direction of boosting technologically highly advanced 
and innovative knowledge-driven industries with key enabling technologies, 
such as nanoelectronics, advanced materials, industrial biotechnology, 
photonics, nanotechnology and advanced manufacturing systems, which would 
enable the EU to move along the global value chains (European Commission, 
2012). This type of industrial policy is also at the basis of the EU’s most recent 
initative aimed at increasing EU competitiveness through “knowledge-driven 
reindustrialization” (European Commission, 2013). 
Within the broader discussions on the New Growth Model for Eastern Europe 
(see Nuti, 2009; Becker et al., 2010; Berglof, 2010), the model in the WB 
countries, in particular, is being reconsidered, since these countries have generally 
made less progress than the CEEB countries. It is interesting to note that the EU 
pro-competition industrial policies were adopted in almost all WB countries in 
the 2000s – state aid to industry was reduced, while horizontal and decentralized 
approaches to industrial policy have been replacing the older reliance on more 
direct vertical forms of industrial policy that had been designed to support key 
industries. The WB countries have implemented policies to support SMEs, 
develop technology parks, local industrial clusters and promote the transfer of 
knowledge from universities and research institutes to the business sector (see 
Bartlett, 2011). However, judging from the level of economic development of 
these countries today, their industrial diversification, structural changes and 
export growth, this type of policy has not substantially contributed to their 
economic recovery and catching up. 
Measures for achieving export-led growth in the Balkan transition countries, 
that are proposed in some recent studies, will probably not be sufficient without 
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deeper industrial restructuring and modernization. Part of the recent literature 
clearly stresses the importance of industrial policy in its various dimensions, 
encompassing not only horizontal measures to increase firms’ competitiveness 
but also concrete government measures to support structural changes, industrial 
diversification and upgrading. Due to the strong decline in FDI from 2007 
onwards, the WB countries will have to rely much more on their own resources 
to finance investment and growth. They will also need a more focused industrial 
policy, not to subsidize national champions but to encourage investment and 
faster industrial transformation. Industrial policy ought to be the key ingredient 
of the new development model in the WB countries, where some of the issues 
stressed in the recent literature on industrial policy could be useful (see Cerovic, 
Nojkovic and Uvalic, 2012). 
Given that the global economic crisis has brought industrial policies back on 
the EU agenda, measures to support industrial development must also become 
a crucial component of the new approach to development in the WBs. The 
governments of the WB countries should implement a more targeted industrial 
policy to encourage investment, R&D, and innovation both generally and in those 
sectors that are considered particularly important for the country’s economic 
development. An important lesson for the WBs from the EU experience is that 
future drivers of industrial change might not be found in large old industries 
in traditional sectors, but in knowledge-driven and creative industries. Value 
added in industries with high knowledge, skills and technology intensity is much 
greater than in traditional industries. 
At the same time, policy recommendations that stem from the EU experience, 
especially from the older member states, should take into account that different 
institutional contexts lead towards different outcomes of industrial policy, 
frequently determining the very success (or failure) of the chosen industrial 
policy. As shown by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006), not only single 
policy institutions such as educational systems, trade and regulatory setting 
and R&D policies, but also the interlocking complementarities within the 
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institutional arrangements of the national innovation system may play a key role 
in the catching-up process. Thus, structural change in the WBs might depend 
on a whole set of policies and institutions that favor reallocation processes and 
remove the sources of inefficiency and economic backwardness (European 
Commission, 2013: 60).
The WB governments could draw on the EU experience to devise industrial 
policies that would be more efficient in sustaining industrial development, in 
the function of export-led growth and a faster process of catching-up. Being 
at one third of the EU-27 average level of development, the WB countries will 
probably be constrained, in most cases, to imitate the more developed countries, 
rather than to innovate. A concrete strategy could be to follow Lin and Monga’s 
(2010) recommendation: namely, a country should look for its latent comparative 
advantage by targeting the mature industries in countries that are twice as 
developed. 
If we look at the level of development of the WB countries, there are wide 
differences between the most and the least developed country, Croatia and 
Kosovo, but the remaining five countries have similar levels of development. If 
we exclude Croatia which is much more developed and is already an EU member, 
the latent comparative advantage of the other WB countries could be sought 
following the experiences in sectoral specialization of countries which are twice 
as developed. If we consider GNI per capita (at PPP) in 2009, Albania and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina could look up to sectoral specialization of Latvia and Lithuania 
(GNI of US$ 16,700); Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, of Croatia (GNI 
of US$ 19,040), Slovakia (GNI of US$ 21,600) or the Czech Republic (US$ 
23,610); while Croatia could look up to countries such as Austria, Denmark or 
Sweden, which in 2009 all had a GNI per capita (at PPP) of around US$ 38,000. 
Industrial policy also ought to be considered at the regional level, through 
the creation of specific networks among the WB states. Although regional 
cooperation among the WBs has frequently been viewed with suspicion, these 
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small countries can only gain from trans-national networks in the area of science, 
R&D, technology, energy, infrastructure. In line with the long-term objectives 
in the EU, the WB countries also need a 2020 strategy that would create new 
employment opportunities, increase investment in R&D, human capital and 
innovation. In the meantime, on 21 November 2013, such a 2020 Strategy 
for Southeast Europe has indeed been adopted by Ministers of all Southeast 
European countries at the conference of the Regional Cooperation Council in 
Sarajevo (see http://www.rcc.int), which suggests that these regional objectives 
will be carried further. 
5  Concluding Remarks
In the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis, industrial 
development has emerged as one of the key issues in the current debate on how 
to strengthen competitiveness of the EU. In reference to Eastern Europe, the 
discussions have focused on the New Growth Model. For the WB countries 
in particular, the policies applied so far ought to be reconsidered, since these 
countries have generally made less progress than the CEEB countries. However, 
measures that have been proposed for achieving faster economic development 
and raising competitiveness of the WB economies will probably not be sufficient 
without deeper industrial restructuring and modernization. The rich experience 
in industrial development in the EU member states could prove useful to the 
WBs. 
The evolution and changes in the role of manufacturing industry in the EU 
clearly illustrate the main patterns of structural changes that have been similar 
across countries. However, there has also been an increasing differentiation 
among countries and these changes have not been unidirectional. The WB 
countries could draw on the experience of the more advanced EU members that 
have maintained a solid manufacturing base, in order to devise industrial policies 
and patterns of specialization that could strengthen their own manufacturing 
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industries, promote export-led growth and accelerate economic development. 
Given that the WB economies are still relatively underdeveloped, devising such 
policies would benefit not only the WBs. The strenghtening of key industries 
could contribute to faster economic growth and the catching-up process, in 
this way reducing the future costs of accession of the WBs to the EU. Devising 
such industrial policies, therefore, should be a common goal that ought to be 
supported by EU programs presently aimed at helping WBs development efforts. 
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